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DISABILITY RIGHTS, DISABILITY 
DISCRIMINATION, AND SOCIAL INSURANCE 
Mark C. Weber∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Are statutory social insurance programs, which provide 
contributory tax-based income support to people with disabilities, 
compatible with the disability rights movement’s ideas? Central to 
the movement that led to the Americans with Disabilities Act1 is the 
insight that physical or mental conditions do not disable; barriers 
created by the environment or by social attitudes keep persons with 
physical or mental differences from participating in society as 
equals.2 This civil rights model of disability contrasts with medical 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Vincent DePaul Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.A. Columbia, J.D. Yale. Thanks to Kim 
Brown for her research assistance. Thanks to my co-panelists Ravi Malhotra and Samuel Bagenstos and 
to others who contributed comments when I presented an early version of this paper at the 2007 Society 
for Disability Studies annual meeting. Special thanks to Elizabeth Emens, Ravi Malhotra, Ani Satz, 
Mitchell Rubinstein, Michael Stein, Michael Waterstone, and  David Weisbach for their insights on the 
draft. © Mark C. Weber. 
 1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101–12213 (West 2008). 
 2. See, e.g., Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch, Disability Beyond Stigma: Social Interaction, 
Discrimination, and Activism, 44 J. SOC. ISSUES 3, 6-14 (1988) (developing and elaborating on minority 
group model of people with disabilities); Harlan Hahn, Advertising the Acceptably Employable Image: 
Disability and Capitalism, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 172, 174 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 1997) 
(describing a minority-group model of disability); Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled 
and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L. REV. 809, 814–16 (1966) (applying civil rights “integrationist” 
approach to disability); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: 
Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA 
L. REV. 1341, 1357–58 (1993) (describing civil rights model of disability); see also Paula E. Berg, 
Ill/legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category of Disability in Antidiscrimination 
Law, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 9 (1999) (“This social-political model rejects the premise of the 
moral and biomedical perspectives that disability is inherent within the individual. . . . [I]t understands 
disability as contextual and relational, . . . as a broader social construct reflecting society’s dominant 
ideology and cultural assumptions. While it acknowledges the existence of biologically based 
differences, the social-political model locates the meaning of these differences—and the individual’s 
experience of them as burdensome—in society’s stigmatizing attitudes and biased structures rather than 
in the individual.”) (footnotes omitted). It is possible to draw distinctions among various forms of social, 
civil rights, and minority group models, but that step is not necessary for developing the argument in this 
Article. See generally infra text accompanying notes 88–95 (discussing social model in greater depth, 
including recent criticisms). 
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models, which frame disability as a bodily or mental defect or 
condition.3 
The conflict between the civil rights approach and insurance seems 
apparent. A person takes out insurance to deal with tragedy, such as 
premature death, or damage, such as accidental harm to an 
automobile or home. Social insurance, for example, the United States 
Social Security old-age and disability programs, consists of 
government-run insurance to cover risks of advanced age and 
disability for which the private market has not provided affordable 
coverage.4 But the civil rights approach to disability posits that 
disability is not a risk, not a tragedy, and not a damage or defect.5 
Instead it is a maladaptation of society to human variation.6 
Does there remain a justification for programs such as disability 
insurance? Is there even a justification for expansion of social 
insurance, for example, to establish partial disability pensions or 
expanded health coverage, a justification that is compatible with 
disability rights ideas? This Article will answer yes to both questions. 
It will suggest expansion of social insurance based on the recognition 
that society at present imposes physical and attitudinal harms whose 
costs to individuals with disabilities should be publicly insured. 
Most legal commentary on disability issues concerns itself with the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and its role in combating 
disability discrimination,7 particularly employment discrimination.8 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 89–91 (discussing variations on civil rights model). 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 29, 58. Those without high incomes also lack the ability to 
accumulate private savings to cover long-term disease or disability, or even old-age. See infra text 
accompanying notes 45–46, 55, 127. 
 5. This approach to disability as something other than a tragic condition manifests itself in 
challenges to various legal developments, such as actions for wrongful life brought on behalf of infants 
born with disabilities that could have been detected by genetic testing, see Wendy Hensel, The Disabling 
Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 142 (2005), and 
damages awards for hedonic loss stemming simply from the fact of long-term disability, see Samuel R. 
Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. 
REV. 745, 748 (2007). Moreover, it manifests itself in attitudes among disability advocates that are often 
ambivalent and sometimes hostile to the idea of social welfare payments on the basis of disability. See 
infra notes 11, 89, 91. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 89–91 (discussing civil rights approach to disability). 
 7. Recent articles of interest on the topic of disability discrimination, particularly employment 
discrimination, include Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the Americans with 
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The social welfare aspects of disability law have been neglected in 
this debate, despite the salience of income support issues to persons 
with disabilities and their families.9 Over the past ten years, however, 
a number of legal scholars have taken up the topic of disability-
related social interventions other than employment discrimination 
law,10 and one prominent writer has gone so far as to call social 
welfare the “Future of Disability Law.”11 This Article adds to the 
current discussion by exploring social insurance from a disability 
rights perspective.  
Part I of this Article takes up social insurance in general, defining 
it and describing Social Security Disability Insurance, the principal 
American social insurance program for individuals with disabilities. 
                                                                                                                 
Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992, 995–97 (2008); Bradley A. Arehart, When Disability Isn’t “Just 
Right”: The Entrenchment of the Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 
181, 182–83 (2008); Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable Accommodation 
and Resistance Under the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 59, 60–61 (2008); Seth D. Harris, 
Disabilities Accommodations, Transaction Costs, and Mediation: Evidence from the EEOC’s Mediation 
Program, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 2–7 (2008); Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I 
of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 305, 306-07 (2008); Jamie L. Ireland & Richard Bales, Title II of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Its Prohibition of Employment Discrimination, 28 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 183, 184–87 (2008); Dustin Riddle & Richard Bales, Disability Claims for Alcohol-
Related Misconduct, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 699, 703 (2008); Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans 
with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 522 (2008). A helpful guide to the basic disability discrimination law and 
some of the most important of the discrimination scholarship is RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY 
DISCRIMINATION (6th ed. 2007); see also MARK C. WEBER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY LAW (2007) 
(analyzing basic doctrine and leading cases).  
 8. See Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1811–12 (2005) (discussing tendency of legal scholarship on ADA to emphasize 
employment discrimination).  
 9. Although much of the disability studies scholarship that relates to law focuses on discrimination, 
social welfare policy is an emerging disability studies topic. See Peter Blanck & Helen A. Schartz, Guest 
Editor’s Introduction, 26 DISABILITY STUD. Q. 1, 5 (2006) (describing “the economic reality that an 
unacceptably high proportion of persons with disabilities in the U.S. and abroad live in poverty” as an 
increasingly important issue in disability studies). 
 10. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans 
with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1998); 
Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social Welfare System, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 361, 362 (1996); Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A 
National Employment Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 123, 124 (1998). 
 11. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1 (2004). An 
article that makes similarly broad claims for the importance of social welfare law and suggests extensive 
policy reforms is Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist Examination, 
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 940–43 (2000). 
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Disability Insurance contrasts with welfare initiatives, which fall 
outside the social insurance definition. Part II discusses the rationale 
for social insurance, as opposed to the other public interventions that 
address disability and additional hazards of life in a free market 
economy. It relates social insurance to work, noting the significance 
of the Social Security Disability Insurance work history requirement. 
Part III asks about the specific role of social insurance against 
disability in the contemporary economy. Part IV poses, and tries to 
answer, the question whether social insurance against disability is 
fully consistent with a civil rights model of disability. Part V 
proposes expansion of social insurance for persons with disabilities 
and explains how this step is consistent with a civil rights approach to 
disability. 
I.   WHAT IS SOCIAL INSURANCE? 
The term “social insurance” is most commonly used for mandatory 
government programs that provide monetary protection against risks 
associated with living in an industrial or post-industrial society in 
which income typically derives from paid work.12 Principles of social 
insurance, as opposed to relief or welfare programs,13 include: (1) 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYC., SOCIAL INSURANCE, http.//www.britannica.com (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2008) ; National Academy of Social Insurance, What Is Social Insurance?, 
http://www.nasi.org/info-url_nocat2708/info-url_nocat_show.htm?doc_id=50066 (last visited Jan. 21, 
2009). 
 13. A contrast may also be drawn between, on the one hand, social insurance benefit programs 
financed by payroll or other dedicated taxes and, on the other, tax expenditure schemes, which indirectly 
subsidize benefits by granting tax exemptions. The present American system of allowing tax exemptions 
for employee group plan health insurance premiums is an example of the latter. Andrea Louise 
Campbell, Americans’ Views on Public Benefits and Costs, National Academy of Social Insurance, May 
29, 2008, http://www.nasi.org/usr_doc/Campbell_NASI_Presentation_05_29_08.pdf. Another 
mechanism of financing benefits is placing mandates on employers (or employees) without providing 
tax breaks or other subsidies, forcing the target of the regulation to pay. Like tax expenditure plans, this 
may mask the real cost of the public policy. Lawrence H. Thompson, The Advantages and 
Disadvantages of Different Social Welfare Strategies, 57 SOC. SEC. BULL. 1, 3, 10, (1994). Nevertheless, 
employer mandates and various current and proposed tax expenditure programs may be highly 
beneficial aspects of public policy with regard to persons with disabilities. See generally Francine J. 
Lippman, Enabling Work for People with Disabilities: A Post-Integrationist Revision of Underutilized 
Tax Incentives, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 393 (2003) (discussing tax incentives); Mark C. Weber, Beyond the 
Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Employment Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. 
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entitlements are work-related, based on work history or the 
contribution of specific amounts of taxes, and sometimes on current 
connection to the work force; (2) means tests (maximums for outside 
income and assets) are not used, or are used only sparingly; (3) the 
program is contributory in the sense that it is largely or fully 
supported by specific taxes, typically taxes on wages that the 
potential beneficiaries pay; (4) participation is universal and 
compulsory, to avoid adverse selection and to have effects that are 
neutral with regard to changes of employer or employment; (5) rights 
to benefits are clearly defined by law.14 
Social insurance as a political development is usually traced to 
Otto von Bismarck’s institution of old-age pensions and other benefit 
programs in Germany in the 1880s in order to undermine support for 
socialism.15 Workers’ compensation for industrial accidents was first 
introduced in the United States at the state government level. 
Between 1911 and 1920, state legislatures in forty-five states passed 
workers’ compensation laws.16 Unemployment insurance also began 
at the state level,17 but the Federal Social Security Act of 193518 was 
                                                                                                                 
L. REV. 123, 171 (1998) (discussing employer mandates); see also Theodore P. Seto & Sande L. Buhai, 
Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053, 1056 (2006) 
(analyzing impact of various tax provisions on people with disabilities). See generally David A. 
Weisbach, A Welfarist Approach to Disabilities, Aug. 2007, 
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1008985. (noting that under welfarist economics 
principles, income tax adjustments constitute best form of redistribution of resources to persons with 
observable disabilities, but supporting in-kind provision of public goods such as architectural 
modifications, in general and with respect to persons whose disabilities are not observable). 
 14. OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION AND STATISTICS, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN. SOCIAL SECURITY 
PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 8–10 (1997). 
 15. See PAUL H. DOUGLAS, SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES 242 (2d ed. 1939) (describing 
German program); see also BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYC., supra note 12 (“The first compulsory social 
insurance programs on a national scale were established in Germany under Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck: health insurance in 1883, workmen’s compensation in 1884, and old-age and invalidity 
pensions in 1889.”). In their history of United States social insurance and related policy initiatives, 
Edward Berkowitz and Kim McQuaid place less emphasis on European antecedents and greater 
emphasis on the late nineteenth and early twentieth century American institution of private employer 
programs providing security to workers against losses from injury, disease, and unemployment, as well 
as promoting company housing and stock ownership, all as a means to uplift industrial workers and 
promote loyalty. EDWARD BERKOWITZ & KIM MCQUAID, CREATING THE WELFARE STATE: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY REFORM 11–34 (1988). 
 16. BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID, supra note 15, at 46 (collecting sources). 
 17. Id. at 111. 
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the key development in American social insurance. It ushered in a 
universal program of old-age security and a federal-state 
unemployment insurance program, created non-contributory, means-
tested welfare programs, and set the groundwork for future social 
insurance programs such as Disability Insurance19 and Medicare,20 as 
well as modern federal and federally assisted welfare for needy 
people with disabilities who lack connection to the workforce.21 
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) is the most significant 
American social insurance program affecting working-age persons 
with physical or mental disabilities.22As with Social Security for 
retirement in old age, workers contribute payroll taxes, which 
employers match with their own contributions; these amounts 
constitute the Social Security Disability Trust Fund.23 In order to be 
deemed “insured” for purposes of the disability program, a person 
must have worked a sufficient number of calendar quarters (based not 
on actual quarters of work but on earnings from work per year) 
during his or her lifetime and before the onset of disability.24 Then if 
the person cannot “engage in any substantial gainful activity25 by 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Pub. L. No. 74–271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1397jj (2000 
& Supp. V 2006)). 
 19. See John R. Kearney, Social Security and the “D” in OASDI: The History of a Federal Program 
Insuring Earners Against Disability, 66 SOC. SEC. BULL.3, 1 (2006) (describing history of Disability 
Insurance program). 
 20. See EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, ROBERT BALL AND THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 120–63 
(2005) (describing history of Medicare program). 
 21. See id. at 207–09 (describing development of Supplemental Security Income program). 
 22. For a comprehensive description of various disability programs in the United States, including 
those that provide income support and in-kind assistance, see Robert Silverstein, Emerging Disability 
Policy Framework: A Guidepost for Analyzing Public Policy, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1691, 1700–04 (2000). 
 23. See 26 U.S.C. § 3111(a) (2000). The fund exists on the books of the Social Security 
Administration, but is not computed separately for general federal budget accounting purposes. In a 
sense the fund is imaginary because it is invested in United States government bonds, which 
economically is the same as the government never issuing the bonds; current payroll tax payments fund 
current disability insurance benefits, essentially establishing what is termed a pay-as-you-go system. See 
Weber, supra note 11, at 925 (collecting sources). 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 414 (2000). About three-quarters of the working-age population has “insured” status.  
Kalman Rupp et al., Disability Benefit Coverage and Program Interactions in the Working-Age 
Population, 68 SOC.  SEC. BULL. 1, 9 (2008) (using 1996 data). 
 25. Generally speaking, substantial gainful activity is that which earns more than an average of $940 
per month net of impairment-related work expenses, as of 2008. Social Security Online, Substantial 
Gainful Activity, (last visited Oct. 17, 2007), http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/sga.html.With regard to 
the DI program (but not the SSI program), the amount is higher for persons who are blind. Id. Special 
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reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 
which can be expected . . . to last for a continuous period” of a year 
or result in death,26 the person is entitled to monthly payments in an 
amount roughly proportional to past taxed earnings, within 
established benefit limits.27 In June, 2008, the number of persons 
receiving DI was 7,912,000, at an average monthly amount of 
$1,004.20 (average spousal and children’s benefits amounts were 
$266.50 and $299.30, respectively).28 There is a modest redistribution 
effect in which persons who are at the lower end of the benefits scale 
get slightly more compared to their contributions than those at the 
higher end do, but that is not inconsistent with social insurance 
principles; payouts need not be strictly proportional to pay-ins as long 
as some essential connection exists between benefits and work-
related tax contributions.29 
Individuals who receive DI are eligible for Medicare Part A, which 
covers hospital costs and a few other medical expenses, and Medicare 
Part B, which covers doctor bills and other medically necessary and 
preventive services subject to various costs, after twenty-four months 
on DI.30 They are also eligible to participate in prescription drug 
coverage under Medicare Part D.31 Because the basic Medicare 
benefit is supported by the Medicare payroll tax,32 it too qualifies as 
                                                                                                                 
rules and exceptions exist with respect to the application of the substantial gainful activity test. 20 
C.F.R. § 404.1574 (2008). 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2000). 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(4)(A) (2000). Limited benefits are also available to spouses and children. 
There is a five-month waiting period from the onset of disability to when DI payments begin. Social 
Security Online, Social Security Handbook (last revised Jan. 30, 2006), 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP_Home/handbook/handbook.05/handbook-0502.html.  
 28. See Office of Policy, U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Monthly Statistical Snapshot, 
 http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2008). 
 29. See BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID, supra note 15, at 135–36 (discussing similar situation with regard 
to old-age benefits). Of course, even in private insurance, payouts are at most only roughly proportional 
to premiums paid. 
 30. The most lucid explanation of Medicare eligibility and benefits is found in Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services, Medicare & You (2009), available at 
 http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/10050.pdf . The statutory citation for the program is 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1395–1395iii (2000 & Supp. V 2006). 
 31. See sources cited supra note 30. 
 32. The Medicare Part A payroll tax is 1.45%, DI is 0.9%, and Old-Age and Survivors Insurance is 
5.3%. These are matched by employers, and self-employed persons pay both shares. For all but the 
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social insurance, and is part of the package that persons who meet the 
disability standard receive in return for the tax contributions taken 
from their paychecks during their working careers. 
As social programs go, DI is middle-aged. In 1934–35, President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s Committee on Economic Security proposed 
social insurance for temporary disability and urged further study of 
social insurance for permanent disability.33 Unemployment insurance, 
old-age insurance, and federal support for welfare programs proved 
to be higher priorities, however, and disability insurance was not part 
of the original Social Security Act of 1935.34 Even the Economic 
Security Committee’s proposal for a federal-state health insurance 
program fell by the wayside.35 American Medical Association 
opposition to health insurance initiatives spilled over into opposition 
to a national disability insurance program,36 but Presidents Roosevelt 
and Truman continued to voice strong support for social insurance for 
disability.37 Initial dissent by private insurance interests declined over 
time.38 In the early 1950s, Congress approved a program called the 
“Disability Freeze,” in which workers who became disabled after 
working long enough to earn old-age Social Security benefits at 
retirement received protection from loss of old-age benefits as a 
result of low or no earnings in the years between disability and 
retirement age.39 The freeze demonstrated that a federal disability-
                                                                                                                 
Medicare Part A assessment, taxable earnings are capped at $102,000 per year in 2008. Office of Policy, 
U.S. Soc. Sec, Admin., Program Highlights, 2007–2008, 
 http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/prog_highlights/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2008). 
 33. EDWIN E. WITTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 208 (1963) (reproducing 
report).  
 34. See DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 84–125 (describing history of Social Security legislation). 
 35. Kearney, supra note 19, at 2–3. 
 36. BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID, supra note 15, at 172. The American Medical Association had been 
receptive to federal disability insurance prior to the health insurance proposal. EDWARD BERKOWITZ, 
DISABLED POLICY 186 (1987). 
 37. Experts within and outside the Social Security Administration, including Arthur Altmeyer and 
Edwin Witte, pushed the disability proposal. See Kearney, supra note 19, at 5. 
 38. See Interview by Peter A. Corning with Roswell Perkins, at 28, 86-92 (Oral History Research 
Office, Columbia Univ., Soc. Sec. Admin. Project, Part IV, No. 160, (Apr. 2, 1966)). Perkins was 
Assistant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare during the Eisenhower Administration. Some 
industry opposition remained, however. See Kearney, supra note 19, at 7–8.   
 39. Dating this program is something of a challenge. Congress passed a freeze bill in 1952, but in a 
House-Senate compromise, it was never put into operation. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 36, at 71–72. In 
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based insurance program was workable,40 and in 1956 Congress 
established the DI program essentially as it exists today.41 The one 
major modification came in 1960, when Congress removed the 
original requirement that a recipient of benefits had to be fifty years 
old. The Eisenhower administration had opposed the DI program at 
first, but not vigorously, and eventually supported the elimination of 
the age minimum.42 In 1965, Congress established Medicare as a 
natural complement to existing Social Security cash programs, 
manifesting what historians Edward Berkowitz and Kim McQuaid 
term Social Security’s “halo effect.”43 
Persons who do not meet the DI earnings requirements before 
onset of disability, and who are poor, may qualify for Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI), as may persons who are poor and whose DI 
amount is lower than the SSI amount plus a $20 income disregard.44 
The SSI payment for an eligible individual is $637 per month as of 
2008.45 Eligibility is measured by both income and assets.46 The SSI 
                                                                                                                 
1954, Congress passed a bill that actually went into effect. Id. at 72. Roswell Perkins supported the 
freeze.  Kearney, supra note 19, at 8–9. 
 40. Other civilian disability-related programs, such as one for civil-defense workers, also proved 
workable, and this bolstered the DI proposal. Kearney, supra note 19, at 6, 9–10. 
 41. Pub. L. No. 84–880, 70 Stat. 815 (1956). 
 42. Roswell Perkins described Secretary Folsom of HEW as torn over whether to support the DI 
program. Interview by Peter A. Corning, supra note 38, at 28. Secretary Flemming led the support for 
removing the age requirement.  BERKOWITZ, supra note 36, at 109–10.  
 43. BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID, supra note 15, at 212. 
 44. Social Security Online, Can I Receive Social Security Benefits and SSI?, http://ssa-
custhelp.ssa.gov/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2008) (Enter search text “Can I receive Social Security benefits 
and SSI?” and then click on associated link). Persons who are poor and over 65 may also qualify for 
SSI, and need not show disability. Id. If they have worked enough in their lifetimes to qualify for Social 
Security’s old-age insurance, they will receive SSI only if their social insurance retirement amount is 
very low. 
 45. Id. An eligible couple receives $956. Because many recipients also are paid DI or have other 
limited sources of income, the average benefit amount is $492 per month as of June, 2008. See Office of 
Policy, U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Monthly Statistical Snapshot, 
 http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2008). 
 46. The income test depends on the state in which the person lives, and includes a number of 
disregards and income-deeming rules; assets other than one’s home, car, family burial plots and small 
life insurance and burial funds generally cannot exceed $2000 ($3000 for a couple). Social Security 
Online, Supplemental Security Income, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/11000.html#part1 (last 
visited June, 2007). 
9
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program applies the same disability standard as DI,47 but the 
population it serves differs in important respects. DI’s earnings 
requirements and the operation of its disability standards cause the 
benefit largely to go to individuals in their fifties and early sixties 
who have weak to modest educational backgrounds and are, in the 
words of one analyst, “prematurely enfeebled” due to injury or 
disease.48 SSI largely serves individuals whose disabling conditions 
have been with them since birth; large numbers have mental 
retardation.49 Many SSI recipients work, often at sheltered or 
supported employment jobs.50 States may provide supplements for 
SSI amounts.51 In most states, persons on SSI automatically qualify 
for medical assistance under the Medicaid program.52 
SSI emerged in 1973, the only surviving part of the guaranteed 
annual income proposals then current in discussions of welfare 
reform.53 It replaced federally assisted state income support for 
impoverished elderly persons and individuals with permanent and 
total disabilities.54 SSI is not a true social insurance program, for it is 
funded out of general federal revenues rather than a dedicated tax on 
earnings and it is means-tested, that is, eligibility is subject to income 
and asset restrictions.  
                                                                                                                 
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (2000). The substantial gainful activity test for blind persons is the same as that 
for persons with other disabilities, however. See supra note 25 (describing test). 
 48. See  BERKOWITZ, supra note 36, at 194–95. 
 49. See Aaron J. Prero, Quantitative Outcomes of the Transitional Employment Training 
Demonstration, in DISABILITY, WORK AND CASH BENEFITS 273, 274 (Jerry L. Mashaw et al. eds., 1996) 
(reporting that 29% of SSI recipients receive payments on basis of primary finding of mental 
retardation). 
 50. See L. Scott Muller et al., Labor-Force Participation and Earnings of SSI Disability Recipients: 
A Pooled Cross-Sectional Times Series Approach to the Behavior of Individuals, 59 SOC. SEC. BULL. 22, 
34–36 (1996) (noting prevalence of sheltered and supported employment among SSI recipients). 
 51. Social Security Online, supra note 44.  
 52. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (2000); Social Security Online, Understanding Supplemental Security 
Income, http://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-other-ussi.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).  
 53. BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID, supra note 15, at 207. 
 54. See id. (discussing operation of program and sources of political support). 
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II.   THE RATIONALE FOR SOCIAL INSURANCE 
Widespread concern over the poverty of elderly persons and 
workers who suffered industrial accidents or were temporarily 
displaced from wage employment fueled political support for social 
insurance programs.55 Social insurance seemed an attractive means to 
undercut the left wing, not just in Bismarck’s Germany but also in the 
Depression-era United States, where mainstream politicians were 
alarmed at Townsend Clubs and support for other share-the-wealth 
schemes.56 Politicians also recognized that if public programs 
employed a tax specifically dedicated to the relevant benefits, citizens 
                                                                                                                 
 55. DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 5–21 (discussing demand for old-age security and unemployment 
protection); see ARTHUR J. ALTMEYER, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 4 (1968) 
(discussing Franklin Roosevelt’s support for workers’ compensation, old-age pensions, and 
unemployment insurance while still in New York state government); WITTE, supra note 33, at 21 
(quoting charge of Federal Committee on Economic Security staff in 1934 to “devote its major 
attention” to “protection of the individual against dependency and distress,” including “accident 
insurance, health insurance, invalidity insurance, unemployment insurance, retirement annuities, 
survivors’ insurance, family endowment, and maternity benefits.”); see also Nancy J. Altman, Social 
Security and the Low-Income Worker, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1139, 1140 (2007) (“Before Social Security, 
people worked as long as they could hold jobs. But this was an insecure state of affairs. The fast pace of 
many jobs ‘wears out its workers with great rapidity. The young, the vigorous, the adaptable, the supple 
of limb, the alert of mind, are in demand . . . . Middle age is old age.’ Once older workers lost their jobs, 
they could seldom find new ones.   Older people almost never had sufficient savings to last until death.”) 
(quoting E.T. DEVINE, MISERY AND ITS CAUSES 125 (1909), as quoted in ABRAHAM EPSTEIN, FACING 
OLD AGE 20–21 (1922)) (footnotes omitted). 
 56. William Haber & Wilbur J. Cohen, Theory and Philosophy of Social Security, in READINGS IN 
SOCIAL SECURITY 38, 39 (William Haber & Wilbur J. Cohen eds., 1948). Francis Townsend, a retired 
doctor, gained immense popularity with his plan that everyone over age sixty receive a federal pension 
of $200 per month as long as the recipient spent the entire sum by the end of the month. See BERKOWITZ 
& MCQUAID, supra note 15, at 114 (“Although the Townsend program was bizarre economics, it made 
very good politics.”); WITTE, supra note 33, at 95–96 (“The thousands of letters which the members [of 
the House of Representatives] received in support of the plan worried them greatly. With the exception 
of probably not more than half a dozen members, all felt that the Townsend plan was utterly impossible; 
at the same time they hesitated to vote against it.”). Townsend was by no means the only “thunder on the 
left.”  DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 69–83 (using term to describe Townsend movement as well as 
proposal for federal all-inclusive unemployment compensation at 100% of prevailing wages); see 
ALTMEYER, supra note 55, at 10 (“The President was, of course, concerned about the Townsend Plan. 
But he was even more concerned about Senator Huey Long’s “share the wealth” movement.”). Long’s 
amorphous every-man-a-king proposal called for widespread redistribution of financial resources from 
rich to poor. Id. 
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would feel an entitlement to the payouts and would oppose efforts to 
repeal the programs or diminish benefits.57 
On a more abstract level, the rationale for government-run, 
compulsory and universal social insurance is the absence of a viable 
market for private insurance for dangers such as industrial disease, 
periodic unemployment, old-age, chronic illness, and disability.58 In 
general, private insurers have been reluctant to offer coverage in 
these areas, at least in the absence of government programs 
underwriting the worst of the risks.59 They fear adverse selection by 
which only those most prone to the conditions will opt for coverage.60 
With regard to unemployment and some of the other risks, they fear 
that the availability of benefits presents a moral hazard to engage in 
conduct that leads to the payout.61 The alternative of personal savings 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See Andrea Louise Campbell & Kimberly J. Morgan, Financing the Welfare State: Elite Politics 
and the Decline of the Social Insurance Model in America, 19 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 173, 173 (2005) 
(“Levied over a broad swath of the population, these [payroll] taxes generate a large amount of revenue, 
yet are politically acceptable because people see them as payments that entitle them to benefits in 
return.”). President Roosevelt was quoted as saying, “With those taxes in there, no damn politician can 
ever scrap my social security program.” ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE 
COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 308–09 (1959). The entitlement is political rather than legally vested, 
however.  During the Red Scare, the Supreme Court upheld the termination of Social Security benefits 
of people who had been deported for being communists, even though being a communist was lawful 
activity at the time. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608–21 (1960). The dissents protested that the 
withdrawal of benefits violated the First Amendment, id. at 621 (Black, J., dissenting), constituted a bill 
of attainder, id. at 628 (Douglas, J., dissenting), and violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws 
and imposition of punishment without a judicial trial, id. at 634 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by 
Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.). See generally Karen M. Tani, Flemming v. Nestor: Anticommunism, the 
Welfare State, and the Making of “New Property,” 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 379, 406 (2008) (commenting 
on connection of case to later constitutional law developments). 
 58. Some companies tried to self-insure their workers or purchase insurance for them in the era 
preceding the New Deal, but eventually many corporate leaders supported public programs to achieve 
the same result. See BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID, supra note 15, at 14–31 (describing early private efforts), 
60–66 (describing later private efforts); 106–23 (describing significant corporate support for public 
efforts, despite major opposition from other business elements). 
 59. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 36, at 52–53 (noting prohibitive rates for disability insurance prior 
to institution of federal program); Kearney, supra note 19, at  3 (“During the Great Depression . . . 
[m]any companies stopped selling disability insurance, others failed financially, and the remainder made 
changes in their . . . practices to make themselves less vulnerable to loss. Sales of disability insurance 
began to increase after 1940, but the policies were very restrictive.”). 
 60. See Advisory Council on Soc. Sec., Permanent and Total Disability Insurance, in READINGS IN 
SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 56, at 421, 422; see also DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 257–62 (discussing 
adverse selection of risks in private pension plans). 
 61. Regarding moral hazard arguments, see Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 237, 252–60 (1996). Arguments based on moral hazard have frequently been leveled at 
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is unrealistic given the demands of wage-earning individuals to spend 
their money on current needs.62 The other alternative is outright 
government redistribution of resources, a serious threat to the existing 
order.63 
In recent years, there have been some challenges to social 
insurance, primarily to the old-age retirement program. The main 
complaints are that the program has too great a redistribution effect 
and does not generate returns as high as private retirement accounts 
would achieve.64 These refrains were far more common in the early 
1990s than they are today, and the recent poor performance of the 
equities market suggests that the time for privatizing proposals has 
passed.65 Moreover, recent demographic trends are making the 
economics of the retirement trust fund look more optimistic than had 
once been projected;66 very modest alterations are all that will be 
                                                                                                                 
unemployment insurance. See, e.g., DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 78–79 (discussing early federal 
unemployment insurance proposal offering payment at 100% of prevailing wage rates). 
 62. See DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 3–7. Moreover, assuming private insurance were available and 
some individuals failed to purchase the insurance based on a calculation of their own marginal utility, 
the government might nevertheless maximize public welfare by providing insurance to all. See 
Weisbach, supra note 13, at 66. 
 63. See Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw, Understanding Social Insurance: Fairness, 
Affordability, and the “Modernization” of Social Security and Medicare, 15 ELDER L.J. 123, 126 (2007) 
(“Indeed, a strong historical case can be made that beginning with Otto von Bismarck’s social insurance 
initiatives in the late nineteenth century, the social provision of income protection against these risks has 
been a fundamental precondition for the flourishing of industrial capitalism. Looked at historically, 
social insurance is a deeply conservative idea, the major viable alternative to state socialism.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 64. See, e.g., Stuart M. Butler & Maya MacGuineas, Rethinking Social Insurance, THE HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION (Feb. 19, 2008), http://www.heritage.org/Research/budget/wp021908.cfm (“The single 
greatest threat to the fiscal health of the United States is the runaway growth of the nation’s major 
retirement and health care entitlement programs.”); Martin Feldstein, Rethinking Social Insurance, 
NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, http://www.nber.org/feldstein/aeajan8.pdf (last visited Aug. 10, 
2008) (“[T]he major forms of social insurance could be improved by shifting to a system that combines 
government insurance with individual investment-based accounts . . . .”).  
 65. Professors Campbell and Morgan contend that support for social insurance approaches has 
always remained strong among the American population as a whole, but that the views of some of the 
affluent policy-making elites have shifted away from support for payroll taxes over time. Campbell & 
Morgan, supra note 57, at 174. 
 66. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., THE 2008 OASDI TRUSTEES REPORT 
(2008), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR08/IV_LRest.html#239829 (“The estimated 
deficits for the OASI, DI, and combined OASDI programs in this report are improved as compared to 
those shown in last year’s report for the longer valuation periods.”); see Paul Krugman, Look and Feel 
15 Years Younger!, The Conscience of a Liberal, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/25/look-
and-feel-15-years-younger/ (Mar. 25, 2008) (“In fact, however, the [Social Security] actuarial balance 
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needed to keep the program solvent and retain its slight redistribution 
effect.67 Similarly modest changes could ensure the actuarial 
soundness of the DI fund well into the future.68 Despite the aging of 
the population, there is some reason to believe that disability benefits 
applications will decrease due to projected long-term declines in 
industrial injuries and disease as the American economy shifts further 
over time from manufacturing to services.69 With regard to DI, the 
idea of private accounts is hardly an appealing alternative to social 
insurance, given that individuals are unlikely to have the time to save 
adequate amounts before the onset of disability.70 
Social insurance also functions as a compulsory employee benefit. 
It rewards work and creates an incentive for people to keep working. 
The requirement of a baseline of work history and current labor force 
attachment gives individuals a reason to become employed and stay 
in the workforce in order to obtain benefits should they no longer be 
able to work.71 When benefits are pegged strongly to contributions, as 
                                                                                                                 
has been improving rather than worsening. It’s now better than it’s been since 1993. What this tells us is 
that projections made in the mid-to-late 1990s were, in the light of subsequent revisions, way too 
pessimistic.  Moral: Social Security’s financial problem is relatively minor. It doesn’t deserve the 
emphasis it receives from most pundits.”). 
 67. See Altman, supra note 55, at 1153–60 (suggesting retention of existing earned income tax 
credit, restoring maximum taxable wage base to 90% of wages in covered employment, considering 
conversion of estate tax as structured in 2009 into Social Security taxes in 2010, and allowing 
government to invest some of trust fund amount in private equity funds, as Railroad Retirement Board 
currently does). 
 68. See Stephen C. Goss, The Financial Outlook for the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program, 66 SOC. SEC. BULL., No. 3, 2005–06, at 47, 51–52 (discussing possible reallocation of 
retirement and disability components of payroll tax, alteration of application of vocational criteria in 
disability definition, and return-to-work initiatives). 
 69. Kalman Rupp & David Stapleton, Determinants of the Growth in the Social Security 
Administration’s Disability Programs—An Overview, 58 SOC. SEC. BULL. 43, 51 (1995) (“The short-
term effect of economic restructuring is thought to increase applications, because disabled workers who 
lose their manufacturing jobs may choose to apply for disability benefits rather than find new work in 
the service sector. The long term effect may be to decrease applications, however, because service sector 
workers are less susceptible to disabling injuries and illnesses.”). Sources on the shift from 
manufacturing to services abound. E.g., A. Michele Dickerson, Consumer Over-Indebtedness: A U.S. 
Perspective, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 135, 137 (2008). 
 70. Patrick Wiese, Financing Disability Benefits in a System of Individual Accounts: Lessons from 
International Experience (Jan. 1, 2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1151238.  
 71. BERKOWITZ, supra note 20, at 23 (“By tying the payments to working, the incentive for people 
to work could be preserved, and an American welfare state might be instituted that maintained the 
efficiency of America’s capitalist economy.”). Some in the disability rights community have questioned 
the attitude that paid employment should be the overriding goal for all persons with disabilities. See, 
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with Disability Insurance and Old-Age Insurance, there is an 
incentive to work at higher-income employment to maximize the 
payout when disability or retirement occurs.72 Moreover, if 
catastrophic events such as the death, inability to work, or prolonged 
hospitalization of a family breadwinner would wipe out the resources 
of even the most prudent saver, incentives to work hard and engage 
in prudent saving are turned upside down. Social insurance to cover 
the worst costs of those events places incentives back where they 
belong. 
Means-tested programs that lack work-relatedness are welfare, and 
fall outside the definition of social insurance.73 Popular, judicial, and 
other sources have strongly resisted the concept of welfare rights, 
despite the efforts of advocates to portray what is more often called 
“assistance” as “entitlements.”74 Critics have rarely and 
                                                                                                                 
e.g., Sunny Taylor, The Right Not to Work: Power and Disability, MONTHLY REV., Mar. 2004, available 
at http://www.monthlyreview.org/0304taylor.htm (“Western culture has a very limited idea of what 
being useful to society is. People can be useful in ways other than monetarily.”). The present discussion 
does not challenge the social desirability of work incentives, in the form of either wages or benefits such 
as disability insurance. 
 72. See J. Douglas Brown, Developments in the Social Security Program, in READINGS IN SOCIAL 
SECURITY 127 (1945) (“But any effective system of social security must enhance incentive [to work], 
whenever possible, rather than impair it . . . . This can be done through social insurance under which 
eligibility and benefits are related to past earnings and productivity . . . .”). 
 73. OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION AND STATISTICS, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN. SOCIAL SECURITY 
PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD vi-vii (1997) (distinguishing social insurance systems from 
means-tested programs limited to needy applicants); see ALTMEYER, supra note 55, at 5 (describing 
origins of Social Security Act) (“While social insurance was regarded as the chief instrumentality to be 
relied on protection against want, it was recognized that it would be necessary to supplement this 
protection in a certain proportion of cases by providing public assistance in accordance with individual 
needs.”). 
 74. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (“[T]he intractable economic, social, and 
even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this 
Court. The Constitution may impose certain procedural safeguards upon systems of welfare 
administration . . . .  But the Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials 
charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of 
potential recipients.”); see also Elizabeth Pascal, Welfare Rights in State Constitutions (2008), 
http://works.bepress.com/elizabeth_pascal/1/ (“Although nearly two dozen state constitutions contain 
some type of affirmative guarantee of welfare rights, state courts are extremely reluctant to enforce these 
rights.”) (abstract). The welfare rights concept is a frequent target of neoconservative movement writers.  
See, e.g., David Kelley, Last Rites for Welfare Rights?, CATO INST., Nov. 10, 1998, 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5788. Other sources note the popular or political 
resistance to welfare rights without editorializing. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights: 
Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political Economy of Welfare Reform, L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Winter-Spring 2000, at 257, 258 (2000) (“Establishing an unassailable right to welfare was 
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unsuccessfully challenged existing social insurance and the popular 
view that it constitutes an entitlement.75 
III.   SOCIAL INSURANCE AGAINST WHAT? 
The obvious answer to the question of what social insurance ought 
to insure against is whatever insecurities ordinary citizens fear and 
the market does not readily offer to insure. The historical record 
indicates that in the United States those risks are industrial accidents 
and disease; temporary unemployment due to reasons that are beyond 
employees’ control; inability to work due to advanced age; inability 
to work due to disability; and various attendant medical and related 
costs.76 In other developed countries (and to some extent in the 
United States), programs also protect against life hazards such as 
temporary illness and partial disability.77 
Social insurance insures against discrimination as well as the 
specific risks that are the programs’ focus. This point at first seems 
counterintuitive, but an analysis of the programs shows that some of 
the hazards against which they protect are more the social attitudes 
that keep people from working to support themselves than the 
                                                                                                                 
once an important goal of legal academics and activists, but is no longer.”); John Arthur O’Connor, 
From Welfare Rights to Welfare Fights: Neo-Liberalism and the Retrenchment of Social Provision 
(2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts) 
 (http://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations/AAI3056266/) (describing reaction against welfare rights 
in several countries). 
 75. But see supra text accompanying notes 73–74 (describing recent reaction against some forms of 
social insurance or its expansion); see also supra note 57, at 608–21 (discussing Flemming v. Nestor). 
 76. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 20,at 23 (noting of influential early Social Security Advisory 
Committee report that “[t]he basic idea that animated the report was that contributory social insurance 
should be used to defend the nation against the inherent insecurities of the modern economy.”). 
 77. See Weber, supra note 11, at 945 (collecting sources regarding European programs). In the 
United States, workers compensation programs allow partial disability benefits, often in the form of 
benefits for a specified number of benefit weeks proportional to the gravity of the impairment. See Peter 
S. Barth, Compensating Workers for Permanent Partial Disabilities, 65 SOC. SEC. BULL. 16–17 (2003–
04) (collecting data on state programs). Veterans Administration benefits also provide partial disability 
pensions. Interestingly, a few people criticized presidential candidate John McCain for receiving these 
benefits based on his war injuries, but there is little general political opposition to the payment of partial 
disability awards to injured veterans. See Why is John McCain Getting $58,000 in Disability (Taxfree)?, 
COFFEE STAINED NEWS, June 10, 2008, http://coffeestainednews.wordpress.com/2008/06/10/why-is-
john-mccain-getting-58000-in-disability-taxfree/.   
16
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss3/5
2009] DISABILITY RIGHTS AND SOCIAL INSURANCE  
 
 
591
 
physical or mental inability to do what work requires. The Disability 
Insurance program recognizes that people over 55 with a limited 
education may still be capable of performing various jobs, but are 
highly unlikely to be hired for them, and so the program applies a 
laxer standard for eligibility for that group.78 Early sources on social 
security for old age recognized the difficulty of being hired when a 
person is elderly even if that individual is perfectly capable of 
working, just as they recognized the increased likelihood of physical 
and mental decline with age.79 Even some government welfare 
programs are in reality a form of protection against discrimination, 
and that fact helps explain their historical trajectory. For example, 
from the 1930s to the 1990s, Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) provided long-term assistance to mothers who 
lacked the support of a man and who faced overwhelming 
discrimination on the basis of sex if they looked for wage 
employment.80 As the social perception about the prevalence of sex 
discrimination changed, the political support for paying anything but 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1562 (2008) (“If you have a severe, medically determinable impairment(s) 
(see §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1521, and 404.1523), are of advanced age (age 55 or older, see § 404.1563), 
have a limited education or less (see § 404.1564), and have no past relevant work experience (see § 
404.1565), we will find you disabled. If the evidence shows that you meet this profile, we will not need 
to assess your residual functional capacity or consider the rules in appendix 2 to this subpart.”). A 
relaxed standard also applies for persons with a marginal education and work experience of thirty-five or 
more years of nothing but arduous unskilled physical labor. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1562(a) (2008). These 
provisions appear to take into account the reality of discrimination against aging workers in the physical 
labor employment market. 
 79. See, e.g., DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 5–6 (noting decline in employment of elderly workers as 
industry replaced farm employment; also noting difficulty of elderly persons in finding work after losing 
jobs). 
 80. Until quite recently, employment discrimination against women was the legal rule rather than the 
unlawful exception. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948) (upholding law barring most 
employment of women bartenders); Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 293 (1924) (upholding law 
forbidding women from employment in restaurants late at night); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 130 
(1872) (upholding bar against women practicing law). The prohibition on sex discrimination in 
employment in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was inserted as an amendment by opponents of the bill in 
order to defeat the race discrimination provisions. See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 
1082, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (describing prohibition on sex discrimination as “the gambit of a 
congressman seeking to scuttle adoption of the Civil Rights Act.”). Although Congress called the bluff 
of the opponent, that event occurred more than a generation after the adoption of federally supported 
welfare for mothers who lacked a husband or other man to support their children.  
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short-term support to single mothers declined81 and AFDC was 
replaced with a program of temporary assistance to needy families.82 
IV.   SOCIAL INSURANCE AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MODEL OF 
DISABILITY 
The role of social insurance in protecting against the harms of 
discrimination brings the discussion back to the civil rights model of 
disability. This model, sometimes thought of as the minority group or 
social relations approach, employs the insight that conditions often 
thought of as disabling do not themselves disable. Instead, barriers 
created by the environment or by social attitudes keep persons with 
physical or mental differences from full and equal participation in 
society.83 This model contrasts with the medical model, which 
focuses on the individual’s departures from the physical or mental 
norm in accounting for disability.84 The medical model suggests an 
emphasis on fixing the individual with a disability through medical 
treatment; the civil rights model places the emphasis on fixing the 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Without linking the phenomenon to changing perceptions regarding the prevalence of sex 
discrimination, Professor Wax observes that support for traditional AFDC declined with changes in 
social expectations and the feeling that needs should be met by collective resources only when the needs 
are not the result of an individual’s voluntary decisions. Wax, supra note 74, at 275 (“Because the 
program was confined to single parents with children, it denied benefits to most able-bodied men. The 
expectation that able-bodied women would work was not part of the program’s design at its inception. 
On the contrary, the program implemented the understanding that single mothers should personally care 
for their children, which required them to depend on public support. Twenty-five years after the 
enactment of the AFDC legislation, however, the consensus that single mothers should depend on the 
government began to fade as more mothers started to work and the number of out-of wedlock births 
exploded.”). 
 82. As part of the 1996 federal welfare revisions, the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF) program replaced AFDC. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). In the absence of a hardship exception (which no 
more than twenty percent of recipients may be granted), an individual may receive aid for no more than 
five years in his or her lifetime. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(A), (C) (2000). 
 83. See infra text accompanying notes 87–95 (describing model). 
 84. Much recent writing discusses the role of the norm or normal in separating out persons with 
disabilities and assigning them inferior roles. See, e.g., LENNARD J. DAVIS, BENDING OVER 
BACKWARDS: DISABILITY, DISMODERNISM, & OTHER DIFFICULT POSITIONS 116–18 (2002) (noting role 
of normal, contrasted with role of ideal, in separating persons with disabilities from others); MARTHA 
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 173–224 (1990) 
(suggesting movement away from emphasis on classification of individuals and towards emphasis on 
relations among people). 
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environment by eliminating physical and attitudinal barriers.85 In the 
most common illustration, the medical model would stress 
rehabilitation of a person with paraplegia,86 or if that cannot succeed, 
persuading the person to accept his or her limits and adjust 
psychologically to them. The civil rights model would point out that 
the disabling condition is not, or at least not simply, the paraplegia, 
but the fact that stairs, curbs, and other artificial obstacles prevent the 
movement of persons who have to rely on wheelchairs or other 
mobility aids to get around. The model would stress altering the 
environment.87 
There are writers who distinguish between what they term a social 
model, which embodies the basic insight about how the social 
environment or attitude interacts with physical or mental traits of 
individuals to cause “disability,” and what they call a civil rights 
model, which proceeds from that insight to note that society imposes 
a disadvantage on persons with disabilities in much the same way 
that it does on other minorities, and prescribes social solutions (such 
as the ADA and other civil rights laws) to end the disadvantage.88 For 
purposes of the discussion here, however, the social model and the 
civil rights model will be considered together as the civil rights 
model. 
Some recent writing challenges various aspects of the civil rights 
model or its applications,89 but the model has been the critical 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 649–53 (1999). 
 86. See RUTH O’BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE 
WORKPLACE 207–21 (2001) (contrasting rehabilitation emphasis of medical approaches to disability 
with legal emphasis related to civil rights approach). 
 87. See Crossley, supra note 85, at 658–59 (discussing alterations in physical environment and social 
policy). 
 88. See Hensel, supra note 5, at 147–50. See generally Ravi A. Malhotra, The Duty to Accommodate 
Unionized Workers with Disabilities in Canada and the United States: A Counter-Hegemonic Approach, 
2 J.L. & EQUALITY 92, 108 (2003) (“It is important to note that there is no single, universally accepted 
conception of the social-political model.”). 
 89. E.g., James Leonard, The Equity Trap: How Reliance on Traditional Civil Rights Concepts Has 
Rendered Title I of the ADA Ineffective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005); Marta Russell, Backlash, 
The Political Economy, and Structural Exclusion, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 335, 336 (2000) 
(criticizing liberal policy assumptions behind ADA); Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, 
Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1203 (2007) (finding limits in social model and 
putting forward disability human rights paradigm, which builds off social-model, development-rights, 
 
19
Weber: Disability Rights, Disability Discrimination, and Social Insuranc
Published by Reading Room, 2009
594 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:3 
 
 
development in thinking about disability for more than a generation.90 
It was an essential part of the intellectual groundwork that led to the 
ADA.91 The model has recently received criticism on the ground that, 
at least in its unadorned form as the social relations approach, it does 
not justify policy prescriptions for changing the physical and social 
environment: Even one who accepts the model’s insight might still 
conclude, from a libertarian, utilitarian, or even egalitarian 
perspective, that trying to change the individual or even doing 
nothing, would be preferable to some environmental changes.92 This 
point seems obvious. Many, perhaps most, middle aged persons are 
disabled from reading fine print. Nobody proposes that all reading 
materials (the environment and its artificial barrier) be made large-
print when the easy personal adaptation of reading glasses (an 
individual, medical-appliance fix) is available. The point of the social 
relations or civil rights model is instead that paying attention to the 
role of the environment opens up the option of changing social 
conditions and attitudes and demonstrates the injustice of refusing to 
do so when changes in the environment would be justified under 
                                                                                                                 
and capabilities ideas); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil 
Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 340 (2001) (noting limits on civil rights approach as embodied 
in ADA); Weber, supra note 11, at 889, 893, 940 (suggesting need for Apost-integrationist@ approach); 
see also Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1415, 1417 (2007) (“An absolutist integrationist perspective disserves the disability community by 
supporting an inappropriately high threshold for the development and retention of disability-only 
services and institutions.”).  Others have defended the model. See, e.g., JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING 
ABOUT US WITHOUT US: DISABILITY OPPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT 127 (1998) (defending minority 
group-civil rights model of disability). 
 90. In a highly influential 1966 article, Jacobus tenBroek and Floyd Matson foreshadowed the 
development of the civil rights model by contrasting “custodialism” with “integrationism.” See tenBroek 
& Matson, supra note 2, at 816. 
 91. See Hensel, supra note 5, at 150 (“[S]ome scholars have credited the political awareness 
engendered by the minority model for the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act and 
comparable civil rights legislation.”) (collecting authorities); see also Weber, supra note 11, at 903–04 
(discussing connection between insights of civil rights approach and terms of ADA). Others have noted 
that the model provided a new basis for self-awareness and shared identity for persons with disabilities. 
See, e.g., JENNIFER L. ERKULWATER, DISABILITY RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SAFETY NET 29 
(2006). 
 92. Adam Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1285–
1306 (2007). 
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whatever social philosophy one embraces.93  For those committed to 
egalitarian ideals, significant environmental changes are indicated.94 
This is why the model moves so seamlessly from social relations to 
civil rights, and why the civil rights model is so crucial in discussing 
modern policy prescriptions.95 
The paradox of one policy prescription—social insurance—for the 
civil rights model is that the civil rights model postulates that 
disability is by no means a hazard of life, but instead an inevitability 
of life. It need not lead to separation from the work force, except for 
the stubborn failure of employers to adapt their workplaces and 
attitudes. One would think that it hardly makes sense to insure against 
the benighted attitudes of employers. 
But then again, perhaps it does. Although it might be nobler to take 
arms against a sea of troubles and by opposing end them, individuals 
still need government programs that keep them from suffering the 
worst effects of discrimination’s slings and arrows. As noted, even 
traditional programs in the form of old-age pensions and welfare for 
impoverished families are to a significant degree addressed to 
discrimination. It is eminently sensible to make social insurance 
available to people with disabilities—a class of individuals who 
experience pervasive discrimination in employment. 96 
                                                                                                                 
 93. See ERKULWATER, supra note 91, at 30–31 (noting role of social model in shifting focus of 
advocacy groups towards changes in social environment). 
 94. See, e.g., CHARLTON, supra note 89, at 89–91 (stressing importance of social safety net). 
 95. This is not to deny that there may be an imperfect fit with traditional concepts of civil rights 
developed in the sex and race context when the civil rights model is applied to employment 
discrimination. See Leonard, supra note 89, at 32–34.  But see Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, 
Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 579 (2004) 
(stressing comparison of ADA obligations with duties to avoid race and sex discrimination that also 
impose costs on employers); Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and 
the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 826, 830 (2003) (same). 
 96. Professor tenBroek, with his usual prescience, understood the role of public support in 
compensating for disability discrimination. In a contribution to the debate over welfare and social 
insurance for people with disabilities, he and Professor Richard Wilson observed: 
[C]ertainly special weight must be given to the circumstances of those who are kept out 
of the labor market so largely by social arrangements and public attitudes. This is the case 
of many of the disabled. Do not they have a right which derives from the social barriers 
which prevent their engaging in productive labor? . . . . [I]s it not a reciprocal duty on the 
part of organized society to keep the path to the labor market free of socially created road 
blocks? If society fails to discharge this duty and men are thereby prevented from 
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There is the drawback, of course, that the availability of the social 
insurance eliminates the most powerful incentive to press for social 
change to end discrimination on the basis of disability. No one should 
be surprised that the existence of a social program eliminating the 
worst risks of an undesirable situation might undercut support for 
doing anything about the situation. One economic study even 
purports to show that the availability of generous old-age pensions 
and unemployment insurance in European countries correlates 
negatively with support for revolution in those countries.97 But social 
insurance in its current form is not so fully compensatory that it takes 
away all the incentive to push to end discriminatory practices and 
attitudes.  
Moreover, social insurance protects against risks other than 
discrimination on the part of employers.98 Even if somehow the 
problem of diminished economic opportunity for people with 
disability due to discrimination were solved, and increasingly experts 
in the legal field doubt that the problem will be solved,99 simply 
living with a disability is expensive. Services and items that make life 
easier (or even possible) are under the control of the medical 
establishment, and medical costs must be paid;100 work time must 
                                                                                                                 
engaging in productive work, should not society compensate for its remissness and 
nonperformance by according a right of equal status to those who have thereby been 
denied access to the main social and economic channels of the community? 
Jacobus tenBroek & Richard P. Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance – A Normative 
Evaluation, 1 UCLA L. REV. 237, 248–49 (1954). 
 97. Robert MacCulloch, Does Social Insurance Help Secure Property Rights? (2001), Soc. Sci. 
Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=265436. 
 98. See supra text accompanying notes 15-59 (discussing social insurance’s role in protecting 
against income loss because of disability or other reasons). 
 99. See Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 239, 240 (2001) (statistical analysis reporting poor plaintiff success rate in ADA employment 
cases); Louis S. Rulli & Jason A. Leckerman, Unfinished Business: The Fading Promise of ADA 
Enforcement in the Federal Courts Under Title I and Its Impact Upon the Poor, 8 J. GENDER, RACE & 
JUST. 595, 595–96 (2005) (reporting low success rate in Eastern District of Pennsylvania); Waterstone, 
supra note 8, at 1826 (contrasting failure rate in employment litigation with successes in non-
employment ADA enforcement). This situation may, of course, be ameliorated by the recently enacted 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
 100. Walter Y. Oi, Disability and a Workfare-Welfare Dilemma, in DISABILITY AND WORK 31, 37 
(Carolyn L. Weaver ed., 1991) (“The disabled make nearly three times as many physician visits a year 
and purchase more than four times as many prescriptions as individuals with no activity limitations.”). 
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also be lost for the privilege of incurring the expense.101 If attendant 
services are needed for ordinary life activities, that cost must be 
borne. 
Perhaps these risks too should be characterized as discrimination. 
In a society committed to the principle of anti-subordination, the 
ordinary costs of survival would not be placed on a stigmatized class 
of individuals when the very weight of the costs contributes to their 
social disadvantage.102 Expenses associated with adapting to 
structures of society created without people with disabilities in mind 
would decline if an anti-subordinationist society replaced the 
structures with better alternatives.103  
But conceptualizing the costs as discrimination does not pay them. 
At the present time, few programs other than social insurance exist to 
take the expense of appliances, attendants, and anything but the 
limited accommodations covered by the Americans with Disabilities 
Act off the shoulders of people with disabling conditions.104 As 
Professor Bagenstos and others have noted, courts have been 
particularly solicitous that employers are free from any requirement 
to fund accommodations that are not directly related to the task of 
performing the job at the workplace.105 Social insurance is one of the 
few sources that currently occupies the cost-shifting role. Given its 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Id. at 40 (“Disability steals time.”).  
 102. See Colker, supra note 89 (discussing anti-subordination as a theory and as applied to disability); 
cf. Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1003, 1004–05 (1986) (developing anti-subordination principle for evaluating social policies in 
connection with sex and race inequality).  
 103. See Colker, supra note 89, at 1447 (stating that anti-subordination would dictate placing costs of 
humane institutions for persons with severe disabilities on society as a whole). 
 104. Financial and in-kind costs associated with living with a disability in society as presently 
constituted may also be borne by relatives and other caregivers, of course, but similarly few mechanisms 
exist to shift these costs from the persons on whom they currently fall. See Eva Feder Kittay et al., 
Dependency, Difference and the Global Ethic of Longterm Care, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 443, 443 (2005) 
(discussing caregiving). 
 105. Bagenstos, supra note 11, at 35 (“The ‘job-related’ rule plainly rules out a number of 
accommodations that could be provided at reasonable cost and without undue hardship and that, while 
necessary to enable many individuals to work, also provide off-the-job benefits.”). Accommodations 
that have been rejected include assistive technology to enable an employee to get to work, medical 
treatment and rehabilitation to enable a person to perform work, and additional training to facilitate a 
new job when the person cannot perform the current one due to disability; the provision of personal 
assistance off the job is far beyond what courts will require. Id. at 36 (collecting cases). 
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political attractiveness and durability, it may be the mechanism of 
choice for future expansion of cost-shifting. 
Moreover, the societies in which social insurance systems are 
found are those in which people must sell their labor in exchange for 
the means of living. Disability often, though not always, diminishes 
what persons with disabilities may have to offer in the labor 
market.106 Limits on stamina reduce the hours that a person can trade 
for wages.107 If some classes of jobs that require physical strength or 
mental capacity of one or another sort are off the bargaining table for 
a given individual, that person is forced to settle for employment that 
may not pay as well as other work. At the extremes, highly 
mechanized societies where the fastest growing sectors of the 
economy sell information and intellectual products may offer few 
opportunities to those with severe cognitive impairments, creating an 
ongoing likelihood of very low wage employment or no employment 
at all.108 Structural conditions of this type are not easily amenable to 
change in a free market system where demand for and supply of labor 
dictate which jobs are available at what rates of pay.109 Recognition 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Obviously, some individuals may, by superhuman effort, compensate for job-related limits, but 
public policy should not be based on the requirement that people put forth heroic efforts over long 
periods of time. Moreover, relying on the “overcomer” image of people with disabilities advances the 
idea that people with disabilities, while “inspirational,” are still are to be “patronized, pitied, and 
excluded for being different.”  Drimmer, supra note 2, at 1354. That a person has overcome something 
suggests an inferiority of the person with whatever has to be overcome. SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING 
DISABILITY 18 (1998). 
 107. Susan Wendell, Toward a Feminist Theory of Disability, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 
260, 271 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 1997) (“[M]any (perhaps most) disabilities reduce or consume the 
energy and stamina of people who have them and do not just limit them in some particular kind of 
physical activity.”); see also Beth Torgerson, I’m Sick and Tired of Being Sick and Tired: Living with 
Post-Viral Fatigue, 20 DISABILITY STUD. Q. 54, 54 (2000) (describing reality of chronic disabling 
condition). 
 108. See Disability Policy Panel, Nat’l Acad. of Soc. Ins., Rethinking Disability Policy: The Role of 
Income, Health Care, Rehabilitation, and Related Services in Fostering Independence, 57 SOC. SEC. 
BULL. 56, 61 (1994) (“Structural changes in the labor market have long-term effects on employment 
opportunities for particular subgroups of workers, including those with disabilities. On the one hand, 
analysis of earnings level trends show[s] a declining demand for workers with limited educations and 
job skill. . . . On the other hand, the shift from manufacturing to service sector jobs is projected to 
increase jobs for well-educated workers which would mean that highly skilled workers with physical 
disabilities will have better opportunities to find work. At the same time, workers with cognitive 
limitations or mental illness may still have difficulty finding work.”). 
 109. This situation, of course, exacerbates the problem of persons whose disabilities prevent them 
from entering the labor market or persisting there long enough to obtain coverage under social 
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of this fact and altering policy to account for it may entail a departure 
from the civil rights model, of course.110 A realist might say that, at 
least in a market economy, the disabling conditions are disabling, and 
that is that. But reading the civil rights model at its broadest, it might 
be observed that one of the disabling environmental barriers is that 
for most people support does not come without the sale of labor, and 
one of the disabling attitudes is the belief that conditions cannot 
change. Thus the civil rights model of disability remains the 
appropriate lens through which to view the problem after all. The 
solution, however, may still be social insurance. 
There remains the concern—directly tied to the problem the civil 
rights model tries to solve—that social insurance reinforces the 
impression that disability is a medical condition, and a pitiable one at 
that: Social insurance protects against the loss of income caused by 
the medically determined defect in the person with the disability 
(albeit in relation to social attitudes and conditions).111 Defects mean 
disadvantage in society. For just this reason, some disability 
advocates hesitate to endorse enhanced publicly funded benefits, 
including expanded social insurance.112 It might be noted, however, 
that economic security per se helps elevate the social status of those 
                                                                                                                 
insurance. Their needs must be met by other initiatives. See infra text accompanying notes 115–133 
(describing difficulties with extending social insurance model to provide support to persons without 
adequate prior connection to work force). 
 110. This is the premise of Weber, supra note 11. 
 111. See Frank S. Bloch, Medical Proof, Social Policy, and Social Security’s Medically Centered 
Definition of Disability, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 189, 190 (2007) (discussing role of medical proof in 
disability determinations). 
 112. See ERKULWATER, supra note 91, at 61 (“[In the 1980s and 1990s], some disabled activists, 
particularly those affiliated with the independent living movement, were ambivalent about endorsing 
enhanced social welfare programs, a division within the disabled community that impeded advocacy 
efforts to present a united front on behalf of an expanded safety net . . . As some disability rights 
activists pointed out, social welfare programs were premised on the assumption that a disabled person 
was helpless, and the state offered support out of a sense of charity or pity.”); see also Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 
997−98 (2003) (“There is, however, an enormous tension between the major disability benefits 
programs—which excuse people with disabilities from the obligation to work and pay them a steady 
cash benefit simply because they have a disability—and the notion that individuals with disabilities 
should test their skills in the world and experience the ‘dignity of risk.’”). But see CHARLTON, supra 
note 89, at 90 (stressing importance of public programs in permitting full social participation by persons 
with disabilities); Bagenstos, supra, at 991−95 (noting support among people with disabilities for 
assistance programs that support independence, such as attendant services). 
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identified by a given characteristic,113 a fact that suggests that greater 
support from social insurance may make disability seem less pitiable. 
Attitudes towards people who are elderly are less condescending, less 
pitying, than they were before those individuals had an independent 
source of income.114 A similar change might occur if more 
individuals with disabilities were covered by social insurance and 
received more livable amounts from it. 
V.   EXPANDING SOCIAL INSURANCE 
Only a fraction of persons with disabilities currently receive 
benefits from American social insurance programs, largely because 
eligibility is tied to the hazard of unemployment on account of 
disability and all those who engage in substantial gainful activity are 
ineligible.115 The standard for disability is also very severe.116 In fact, 
of all the individuals placed on the DI rolls in a given year, one-
eighth die within two years.117 The proportion of individuals who die 
during their first six months on DI is fourteen times that of retirees 
during their first six months on the Social Security old-age insurance 
                                                                                                                 
 113. SPECIAL TASK FORCE, SEC’Y OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, WORK IN AMERICA. 34-36 (1973) 
(finding that income is principal determinant of social status). 
 114. This reality illustrates that basic point that steady income—from whatever source—raises social 
standing. Conversely, desire to keep groups subordinated can become a reason to oppose income 
support.  Paul Douglas noted with regard to the original Social Security bill that senators and 
representatives from the South opposed efforts to set national standards for federally supported state 
welfare payments to the elderly because of fear that higher payments would raise the social status of 
African-Americans receiving the benefits. See DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 100. Social Security 
payments have vastly improved the economic lot of elderly persons. Altman, supra note 55, at 1142 
(“The reduction in the poverty rate of the elderly is directly due to Social Security.”). 
 115. Under some circumstances recipients may be able to resume working under work incentive 
programs for a period of time while collecting reduced benefit amounts. See Kearney, supra note 19, at 
20 (collecting information regarding existing work incentives). 
 116. See, e.g., Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of 
benefits on ground that applicant failed to meet eligibility standard on basis of diabetes and back pain); 
Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663 (7th. Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of benefits on ground that applicant 
failed to meet eligibility standard on basis of fibromyalgia); Bradley v. Astrue, 528 F.3d 1113 (8th Cir. 
2008) (affirming denial of benefits on ground that applicant failed to meet eligibility standard on basis of 
HIV). 
 117. Walter Y. Oi, Employment and Benefits for People with Diverse Disabilities, in DISABILITY, 
WORK AND CASH BENEFITS 113 (Jerry L. Mashaw et al. eds., 1996) (analyzing Social Security 
Administration data). 
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program.118 The degree of disability demanded is extreme in 
comparison to that required by disability insurance programs in other 
countries.119 Given the severity of the existing disability standard, 
and the low level of SSI benefits for persons who lack long-term 
connection to the work force before becoming disabled, it is no 
surprise that the prevalence of poverty among adults with disabilities 
that affect work is three times that of the general population.120 A 
lower disability threshold would be desirable, and would hardly 
undermine the incentives to work that currently exist in the national 
economy.121  
In addition, far more individuals who realistically should be 
considered persons with disabilities ought to receive non-means-
tested partial disability, temporary disability, and sick leave 
insurance, benefits provided almost universally in advanced countries 
other than the United States for persons with an adequate pre-
disability connection to the work force. In other developed countries, 
free or low cost medical care is also taken for granted,122 and 
introduction of that reform in the United States would be a 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Martynas A. Ycas, Patterns of Return to Work in a Cohort of Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries, in 
DISABILITY, WORK AND CASH BENEFITS 169, 171 (Jerry L. Mashaw et. al. eds., 1996). 
 119. See ERKULWATER, supra note 91, at 237. 
 120. Mitchell P. LaPlante et al., Disability and Employment, Disability Statistics Abstract (Jan. 1996), 
available at dsc.ucsf.edu/view_pdf.php?pdf_id=13. Fully 34% of people with disabilities live in 
households with annual incomes of $15,000 or less. Phoebe Ball et al., Breaking the Cycle of Poverty: 
Asset Accumulation by People with Disabilities, 26 DISABILITY STUD. Q. No. 1 (2006) (citing 2005 
Harris Poll data). One-fifth of wheelchair users live in poverty. H. Stephen Kaye et al., Wheelchair Use 
in the United States, http://dsc.ucsf.edu/publication.php (last visited Mar. 21, 2009) (abstract of May 
2002 article). 
 121. See Weber, supra note 11, at 951 (proposing lower DI-SSI disability standard); cf. Jerry L. 
Mashaw, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 225, 226 (1995) (book review) (reviewing Edward H. Yelin, 
Disability and the Displaced Worker (1993)) (describing existing DI benefits, “[I]t is peculiar to imagine 
that a person who can continue to work will instead leave work to seek disability benefits that pay (on 
average) one-third of the mean wage, require a six-month waiting period for application, a two-year 
waiting period for medical benefits, and provide any benefit to fewer than one-half of those who 
apply.”). 
 122. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION AND STATISTICS, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN. supra note 73, 
at xviii-xix (describing medical benefits programs).  
See generally Julie Rovner, In Switzerland, An Easier Path for the Disabled, 
 http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93098547&ft=1&f=1001 (contrasting experience 
of families with autistic children in Switzerland with national health and disability insurance, as opposed 
to United States). 
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tremendous help to persons with disabilities who now must pay 
enormous portions of their incomes for medical costs or private 
insurance. 
Temporary disability insurance was part of the agenda of early 
social insurance advocates.123 Opposition by the medical 
establishment derailed national health insurance, and took temporary 
disability with it.124 Partial disability benefits never had a chance for 
a full hearing in the United States, despite their prevalence elsewhere 
in the developed world.125 Partial and temporary disability insurance 
programs should return to the agenda of social reformers.126 
Significantly, these programs may prove popular even in an era that 
views entitlements with skepticism. They are, after all, tied to work, 
and if means tests are not employed, will maximize incentives to 
work.127 The success of the resistance to privatizing United States 
                                                                                                                 
 123. See WITTE, supra note 33, at 208; President’s Message to Congress on Social Security 
Expansion, 1948 U.S.C. CONG. SERV. 2489, 2490−91.  
 124. See supra text accompanying notes 57–58 (discussing history of New Deal social insurance 
proposals). 
 125. As noted, partial disability benefits are also the rule in the United States with regard to 
impairments related to specific causes, as with service-connected benefits for veterans, injuries and 
diseases at work covered by workers’ compensation, and tortious injuries. See Weber, supra note 11, at 
943−45 (collecting relevant sources). 
 126. See id. at 943−47 (discussing policy advantages of partial disability benefits). Interestingly, an 
expert panel convened by the National Academy of Social Insurance at the invitation of the House Ways 
and Means Committee’s Social Security Subcommittee supported the concept of temporary disability 
insurance, but believed that Congress would not pass such a program at the time the panel met in the 
early 1990s. Jerry L. Mashaw & Virginia Reno, Social Security Disability Insurance: A Policy Review, 
in NEW APPROACHES TO DISABILITY IN THE WORKPLACE 245, 261 (Terry Thomason et al. eds., 1998). 
The panel noted the appeal of partial disability benefits, but was concerned about potential costs and did 
not advocate that step. Id. at 262.  
 127. Work incentive programs have been the major innovation in the DI and SSI programs in recent 
years.  See Weber, supra note 11, at 936−38 (describing work incentives). The key work incentive, of 
course, is simply the absence of a means test. A means test is an obvious barrier to earning income or 
accumulating assets. Asset accumulation is critical to ensuring long-term economic well-being. 
Although some mechanisms exist to permit earning income and accumulating minimal amounts of 
assets, significant loosening of existing restrictions will permit more people to escape poverty. See Ball 
et al., supra note 120. SSI assets limits discourage savings and encourage unwise spending habits. 
Douglas A. Martin, The ADA and Disability Benefits Policy, 6 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 1, 6 (1995). 
As Professor Bloch notes, carefully designed social insurance reforms can provide incentives to build 
the employment capacity of persons with disabilities and facilitate integration (or reintegration) into the 
work force. Frank S. Bloch, Disability and the Contract for Income Support in the Modern Welfare State 
(Sept. 20, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1022982. Professor tenBroek, who was a strong opponent of 
means tests, commented on the psychological harms of imposing harsh conditions on assistance, “Just as 
the habits of freedom are not learned by experiencing slavery, so ambition is not learned by destitution, 
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Social Security shows the lasting foundation of support for 
contributory social insurance. 
Partial and temporary disability insurance will cost money, but the 
same reforms that could put the Social Security trust funds on a 
sounder footing could be used to finance an expansion of benefits. 
Moreover, non-means-tested partial benefits would be an exceedingly 
powerful work incentive, because a person will no longer have to 
completely drop out of the work force to obtain necessary support 
when a medical condition arises or worsens.128 Experts identify delay 
in leaving the work force as the critical area in which work incentives 
can conserve DI expenditures.129 
Whether the potential support for expansion of social insurance is 
broad enough to extend coverage to the hazards of unemployment or 
sub-subsistence employment by those whose congenital or early-
acquired disabilities prevent them from ever entering the labor force 
is another matter. At the moment, these persons are covered by the 
means-tested Supplemental Security Income program, which applies 
the same test for total disability as the Disability Insurance program 
but generally provides much lower benefits, only about 70% of the 
federal poverty level.130 It is possible to view as an ordinary life 
hazard the risk of a lifelong condition that makes it difficult or 
impossible to enter the labor market as that market currently exists. 
But in the absence of a connection to the labor force for that 
individual, the traditional rationale of social insurance is lacking.131 
                                                                                                                 
self-management by authoritarian controls, incentive by denying the hope of gain, or self-respect by 
second-class citizenship.” tenBroek & Wilson, supra note 96, at 299 (discussing mandatory 
rehabilitation programs). 
 128. See Monroe Berkowitz, Reflections of the Honoree, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL 
INSURANCE, June 21, 2006, available at 
 http://www.nasi.org/usr_doc/MonroeBerkowitz_NASI_Presentation_06_21_06.pdf (suggesting 
breaking link between work test and benefits eligibility). 
 129. See, e.g., Mashaw & Reno, supra note 126, at 254−55 (advocating tax changes to create 
incentives to stay at work after onset of disabling condition). 
 130. See Weber, supra note 11, at 950 (detailing calculation). 
 131. Professor Liebman pointed this out a generation ago: 
We could assume that all persons undertake to pay insurance premiums if and when they 
work, and that the promise to pay these premiums is consideration for an insurance 
contract by which society agrees to protect against the possibility that an individual will 
. . . be disabled throughout his life and so never achieve a status of taxpaying 
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Benefits for disabled adult children of deceased, retired, and disabled 
wage-earners are perhaps the closest the current American system 
comes to covering persons with no connection to the work force 
under the social insurance, as opposed to the welfare, rubric. 132 Thus 
even vastly greater development of social insurance along 
conventional lines will not provide economic security to all persons 
with disabilities.133 This drawback should not, however, obscure the 
real gains to be made by pressing for expansion of social insurance 
when enhancement would benefit persons with disabilities. 
CONCLUSION 
Contributory social insurance occupies an important role in the 
economy and society. It protects people against the hazards of 
modern life while encouraging their long-term participation in the 
work force. Disability-related social insurance protects against the 
loss of income that comes from disability, but it also protects against 
the harms of discrimination that stem from the social barriers that 
block persons with disabilities from reaching their full potential in the 
workplace. For this reason, it is consistent with a civil rights 
approach to disability, a model that recognizes the importance of 
environmental and attitudinal obstacles in making physical and 
mental differences disabling. 
Expansion of social insurance is similarly consistent with 
recognition that artificial barriers disable. Temporary and partial 
disability insurance will do more to ease the effects of discrimination 
than the current social insurance system can achieve, and may have 
incidental effects in raising the economic participation and social 
                                                                                                                 
productivity. That this social insurance concept has not been adopted indicates that we 
may be unwilling to regard as insurance a scheme that does not require a connection 
between an individual’s actual contributions and the benefits he will receive. 
Lance Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income: 
Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARV. L. REV. 833, 841 (1976). 
 132. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(F)−(G) (2000) (providing for continued child’s benefits into adulthood 
for covered individual’s dependent children with disabilities). 
 133. For this reason, significant changes in disability-related and other non-social insurance welfare 
programs are desirable. See Weber, supra note 11, at 950−51. 
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status of persons with disabilities. Too few persons with disabilities 
have a long-term connection to the work force for social insurance to 
alleviate the economic woes of the entire population of persons with 
disabilities, but social insurance is a key component of economic 
security for persons with disabilities and would become a still more 
useful one if expanded. 
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